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Abstract 
Like businesses in other developed countries, Spanish firms increased the share of 
skilled workers they employed during the 1990s. This paper attempts to examine 
whether this change in the Spanish labor market can be attributed to demand shifts or to 
skill-biased technological change. It finds, just as in the US, that skill-biased technological 
change is a more likely hypothesis. Using a type of decomposition methodology, I find that 
the increase in aggregate skill mix comes mainly from continuing firms increasing their 
labor skill mixes –presumably in response to the re-tooling or upgrades in technology in 
these firms–. Unlike the findings in the US, my results indicate that the increase in aggregate 
skill mix in Spain seems to be procyclical. 
 
Going further, I also perform sub-decompositions that categorize firms according to 
dimensions that reflect the “idiosyncrasies” of Spain’s labor market; in particular the use 
of permanent vs. temporary contracts. The results support the idea that temporary 
worker contracts may be lending flexibility to the labor market as policymakers intended. 
Finally, I examine the dynamics of skill mix changes according to the firms’ rate of 
technological innovation. The results show that the most innovative firms account for the 
majority of the increase in skill mix during the 1990s in Spain, a finding that support the 
skill-biased technological change hypothesis. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past several decades there has been greater demand for skilled workers and a 
simultaneous increase in the wage gap between skilled and less-skilled workers in many 
industrialized countries1. For example, using data on individual Spanish workers, Bover, 
Bentolila and Arellano (2000) find that Spain had a measurable increase in earnings inequality 
during the 1980s, largely because of more rapid wage growth at the top of the earnings 
distribution towards the end of the decade. Similarly, Torres (2002) showed a growth in the 
skilled/unskilled earnings differential of slightly more than 1% beginning in 1984 and extending 
into the early 1990s, a similar pattern to what other authors have observed in other OECD 
countries. 
 
As economists have attempted to explain the increasing demand and wage gap, 
they have developed two main theories. The first is that changes in product demand, possibly 
due to increased participation in international trade, have led to the expansion of skill-intensive 
products and industries. The expansion of these industries could then lead to a subsequent 
increase in the demand for skilled workers, and thus, in the wage premiums on their 
abilities. The alternative explanation ties changes in the demand for skilled workers to the 
introduction of skill-biased technologies across a broad spectrum of industries [Bound 
and Johnson (1992), Davis and Haltiwanger (1991), Sachs and Shatz (1994)]. If technology 
adoption is pervasive across industries, and if skilled labor is a complement to the new 
equipment or processes, then there will be an increase in the demand for skilled workers 
relative to less-skilled workers and a subsequent increase in their (skilled) wages relative to 
those of less-skilled workers. 
 
Several studies have explored the relationship between technology and skill mix 
and/or wage structure with standard regression analysis. In the US, Berndt, Morrison and 
Rosenblum (1992), Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1997) 
model changes in workforce skill as a function of changes in industry capital intensity and 
industry-level investment in computer equipment. These studies find evidence that capital and 
skill are complements and that there is a positive correlation between changes in the skill of 
workers in an industry and the level of computer investment in the industry. 
 
Krueger (1993) uses cross-sectional worker data and finds that workers using 
computers are better paid than non-users. Dunne and Schmitz (1995), using plant-level data, 
show that workers employed in establishments that use more technologies are paid higher 
wages. In their cross-sectional study, Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997) find that the most 
technologically advanced plants pay their workers higher wages than the least technologically 
advanced plants. However, in their longitudinal study, they find no correlation between 
technology adoption and worker wages, and conclude that most technologically advanced 
plants pay higher wages both pre and post adoption of new technologies. 
 
Dunne, Haltiwanger and Troske (1996) (DHT henceforth) find that while observable 
indicators of changes in technology account of a significant fraction of the secular increase in 
the average non-production labor share, unobservable factors account for most of the secular 
increase. Also in the US, Luque and Miranda (2000) find that unskilled workers in 
                                                                          
1. For example, see Castillo and Jimeno (1997), Castillo (1996), Bover, Bentolila and Arellano (2000) in Spain, and 
Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Davis and Haltiwanger (1994) in the US. 
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high-technology firms get penalized in terms of wages; this result seems to support the 
skill-biased technological change hypothesis. 
 
On the other hand, the results using European data have been less clear. In France, 
Entorf, Gollac and Krazmarz (1999) conduct a study using longitudinal data, but find no 
evidence of skilled-biased technological change. They attribute this result to wage inflexibility 
in the French economy. Similarly in Spain, Bover, Bentolila and Arellano (2000) find little 
evidence of a relationship between technology and skill mix.  They speculate that this result 
could be due their poor measure of a firm’s technical progress. Finally, arguing against the 
earlier papers featuring US data, DiNardo and Pischke (1997) use German data to argue that 
the “computer premium” noted by Krueger has less to do with computer use than it does with 
worker ability. 
 
Perhaps most importantly for the paper at hand, DHT’s decomposition results, 
using US data, indicate that aggregate changes in the nonproduction labor share are 
dominated by within-plant changes. Evidence that the “within” component plays a large part 
in aggregate skill intensity changes is consistent with pervasive, general re-tooling of firms’ 
means of production and the hiring of additional skilled workers. This supports the 
skill-biased technological change hypothesis. Their other main finding is that within-plant 
secular increases are concentrated in recessions. 
 
To sum up, while several studies have provided evidence in favor of the skill-biased 
technological change hypothesis, some recent evidence does not support it and even 
contradicts these earlier results, particularly for European economies. To further explore these 
issues, I use firm-level data from Spain to examine the connection between technology 
changes and shifts in the skill mix of the firms’ employees. I examine these effects both over 
time and across types of firms. To accomplish this, first I follow Dunne, Haltiwanger and 
Troske (1996) methodology and decompose aggregate skill mix changes into four distinct 
components: a within-firm effect that reflects a general increase in workforce skill, a 
between-firm effect that captures the reallocation of the employment from continuing low-skill 
to continuing high-skill firms, a covariance term and finally a net entry term that will be positive 
if entering high-skill firms are displacing lower-skill exiting firms. 
 
These simple exercises have the potential to shed light on the two competing 
hypotheses. For example, if international trade and/or integration into the European 
community have increased the demand for skilled workers, then the observed change in skill 
mix should be primarily a “between-firm” phenomenon because employment should shift to 
more skill-intensive continuing firms. Similarly, if skill intensive industries are growing 
particularly rapidly then this should be reflected in the net entry term. Entering firms would be 
expected to be more skill-intensive than exiting firms. 
 
Alternatively, if the observed aggregate skill upgrading is largely due to skill-biased 
technological change, then changes in aggregate skill intensity are primarily caused by a 
broad spectrum of firms re-tooling and upgrading their means of production. This process 
should be reflected in the decomposition’s “within” component which captures the part of 
aggregate skill mix attributable to continuing firms of all industries changing their individual 
labor skill mixes. There is also a role for net entry in this theory. Several authors [Caballero and 
Hammour (1994) and Campbell (1997)] have suggested that production technologies are so 
deeply imbedded in existing capital, that firms wishing to retool must build their plants from 
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scratch. In terms of the decomposition we would again expect the changes in skill levels to 
come to some extent from net entry. 
 
After performing the decomposition for the entire eight year period, I explore the 
cyclical pattern of these changes by dividing the sample into two four-year periods, each one 
of them corresponding to a recessionary (1990-1994) and recovery (1994-1998) period in 
Spain. 
 
As a preview, my results are consistent with the skill-biased technological change 
hypothesis. The main decomposition indicates that the changes in aggregate skill-mix 
primarily come from the within component. also perform supplementary exercises on the net 
entry term that support this hypothesis. When I examine the cyclical pattern of these changes, 
I find that, unlike in the US, they seem to be procyclical. That is, the bigger increase in skill mix 
occurs during Spain’s recovery period while in the US, the bigger increases occurred during 
recessions. 
 
One of the main differences between the US and Spain’s labor market is 
flexibility.While the US labor market is fairly flexible in terms of the hiring and firing of workers, 
Blanchard et al. (1995) remarked that the microeconomic aspects of the Spanish labor 
market make it one of the most rigid in the industrial world. These rigidities, in the form of 
binding employment contracts carrying high separation costs have been well documented in 
papers such as Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992). In response to these contracts’ negative 
effect on employment trends, the Spanish government in 1984 created alternative types of 
temporary employment of workers with little or no separation costs (legal or pecuniary) upon 
contract termination. These flexible contracts have allowed larger employment responses over 
the course of business cycles, particularly in the downward direction, but their effect on skill 
mix changes is unclear. They have also created a “dual” labor market with workers hired on 
permanent contracts, who enjoy strong employment protection legislation and bargaining 
power through labor unions on one side, and workers employed under temporary contracts 
who lack employment protection and bargaining power, and have much higher turnover rates 
and generally lower salaries. [See, for instance, Dolado, García-Serrano and Jimeno (2001).] 
 
Given the dual nature of the Spanish labor market, interesting questions arise: How 
are these skilled-labor shares being accomplished? What types of firms are the ones 
accounting for most of the change in the aggregate skill mix?  Do the percentage changes in 
skilled and less-skilled workers come about due to changes in the shares of permanent or 
temporary-contract workers? And, how are these dynamics affected by the business cycle? 
 
To address these questions, I perform sub-decompositions of aggregate skill mix 
changes in which I classify firms according to a few key variables that are particularly 
relevant to the “idiosyncrasies” of the Spanish labor market. For example, I classify firms 
according to whether their workforce has a relatively high or low share of workers with 
permanent labor contracts (“high-permanent” or “low-permanent” firms respectively). I then 
perform sub-decompositions according to this distinction to examine the contribution of the 
two types of firms to aggregate skill mix change. This exercise could have implications for 
debates on Spanish (and other European countries’) labor market liberalization if it identifies 
and quantifies the relative contribution of different types of employers to aggregate labor 
skill mix. 
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The results from the sub-decompositions by type of firm and time period show that 
during the recessionary period (1990-1994), the firms with a relatively high percentage of 
temporary contracts account slightly more for the change in skill-mix, while in the recovery 
period (1994-1998), the firms that account for most of the change are the firms with a 
relatively high percentage of permanent contracts. Nevertheless, when I drill down and 
examine the cyclicality of the changes in the percentages of skilled and less-skilled workers of 
“high-permanent” and “low-permanent” firms, the “low-permanent” firms are more sensitive 
to the business cycle and may be fulfilling their role of lending more flexibility to the Spanish 
labor market.   
 
I also divide firms according to their level of technological (process or products) 
innovations and perform sub-decompositions according to these classifications. As could be 
expected given the results supporting the skill-biased technological change hypothesis, I find 
that “High-Technology” firms are mainly responsible for the aggregate changes in skill-mix 
both during the recessionary and recovery periods. 
 
In sum, the paper makes three contributions to the empirical literature on aggregate 
skill mix change. First, it explores changes in aggregate skill mix in the Spanish labor market 
during the last decade and sheds light on the competing hypotheses regarding the increase 
in the skill mix (or ratio) in a European Union country –which can then be contrasted with 
DHT’s findings from the US– including the counter-cyclical skill mix changes they document. 
The second main contribution is to explore the contributions to aggregate skill-mix 
changes of different types of firms, such as those with relatively large (small) shares of 
permanent-contract workers. As indicated earlier, I do this by performing sub-decompositions 
that will show not only what types of firms are mainly responsible for the skill-mix increase 
experienced during the 1990s in Spain, but also how they may achieve these contributions 
differently (within vs. between effects). Thirdly, I explore their behavior across the 1990s 
Spanish business cycle. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces a review of the 
theoretical background underlying the empirical study. Section II follows with a 
description of the estimation methodology, continuing with Section III, which describes 
the data that I use. Section IV first presents a detailed account of the results obtained 
from the main decomposition of changes in skill-mix during the 1990s, and in addition, 
clarifies which of the competing hypothesis they tend to support; I will also explore the 
cyclical pattern of the skill-mix changes and how these changes occur. Secondly and also 
in the Results Section, I will drill down and present the results of sub-decompositions on 
three fronts: i) what types of firms are mainly responsible for the changes in aggregate skill 
mix, ii) how these changes seem to occur, and iii) the cyclical pattern of these changes. 
I finally conclude in Section V. 
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2  Estimation Methodology 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
As mentioned above, decompositions of aggregate skill mix into “Within”, “Between” and “Net 
Entry” components can help us disentangle the relative contributions of skill biased 
technological change and demand shifts in accounting for overall skill mix changes. However, 
before examining the decomposition methodology in more detail, it is useful to succinctly 
present the underlying theoretical framework that helps explain how a firm chooses a given 
skill level (e.g. a given number of skilled and unskilled workers). 
 
Following some of the literature [see for instance, Dunne, Haltiwanger and 
Troske (1996), and Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997)], a firm’s optimal choice of skill mix 
is determined by short run cost minimization given a certain level of output (yit), and a 
given state of technology (Xit), which is embodied in the firm’s capital. I, thus, treat skilled 
and unskilled labor as variable inputs to be determined given yit and Xit. That is, the firm i 
minimizes wstLsit + wutLuit [where wst and wut are the wages of skilled and unskilled workers 
respectively at time (t)] subject to yit = F(Xit, Lsit, Luit) where wst and wut are given. F(.) is 
assumed to be strictly concave2. 
 
The standard condition that equates the ratio of the marginal products to the ratio of 
the wages of skilled to unskilled labor gives us the optimal Lsit and Luit. For the purpose of this 
paper, it is useful to express the optimal skill mix (Mit) as: 
 
Mit = Lsit/(Luit + Lsit) = m(Xit, wst/wut, yit) (1) 
 
The skill mix, Mit, is decreasing in the relative wages of skilled-to-unskilled labor. 
The sign and magnitude of the complementarity between X and skill (mx) will depend 
on the degree of the skill-biased technological change. Short-run nonhomotheticity (my) 
will reflect the changes in the skill mix due to changes in the level of output (for a given X). 
2.2 Empirical Methodology 
The previous section examined how the firm makes its decision about the optimal number of 
skilled and unskilled labor for a given output and state of technology. It focused on the 
optimal within-firm skill mix determination. However, one of the main focuses of this paper is 
to see how the aggregate skill mix in the manufacturing sector changes over time. For this 
purpose, I need to take into consideration not only the within-firm component but also 
changes that occur because of changes in the employment shares across firms. 
 
The type of decomposition I perform follows the one used in DHT (1996) and Foster, 
Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998), which is a modified version of that used by Baily, Hulten, and 
Campbell (1992). As shown in Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (1998), there are alternatives 
as to the precise decomposition used and they can impact the results significantly3. 
Therefore, I use a decomposition that I believe has the most direct economic interpretation 
of the terms in the decomposition. Virtually all of the studies in the literature that use the 
decomposition methodology, consider some form of decomposition of an index of 
industry-level (in this paper, skill mix): 
                                                                          
2. It is assumed that there is some additional factor other than X. 
3. This decomposition differs somewhat from others that have appeared in the literature in subtle but important ways 
that are documented in Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998). 
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(2) 
 
where Mt is the index of industry skill mix, sit is the share of firm i in the industry (e.g., output 
or employment share), and mit is an index of firm-level skill mix. The decomposition, then, 
considers the roles of changing shares versus changing the skill mix at the micro level in a 
manner that permits an integrated treatment of the contribution of entering and exiting firms. 
 
Using the notation from the previous section we would have: 
 
(3) 
 
where Mt is the aggregate skill mix in period t (number of skilled workers divided by total 
number of workers) Lt is aggregate total employment and  Mi and Li  are the corresponding 
firm-specific terms defined accordingly. The first three terms with subscript C refer to 
continuing firms, the forth term with subscript N refers to entering firms and the last term with 
subscript E refers to exiting firms. 
 
Going back to our decomposition (2), the first term represents a within-firm 
component (for continuing firms) based on firm-level changes of skill mix between t and t-1. 
This firm-level change is weighted by the initial employment share of the firm. As mentioned 
above, one way to look for evidence of skill-biased technological change is to look at 
the “within” component of a decomposition of aggregate skill mix change. If the frequently 
observed wage gap is largely due to skill-biased technological change, then this process 
should be reflected in the decomposition’s “within” component which captures the part of 
aggregate skill mix attributable to continuing firms of all industries changing their individual 
labor skill mixes. 
 
The second term represents the between-firm component for continuing firms, which 
reflects changing employment shares. This change in employment share is weighted by the 
deviation of initial firm skill mix from the initial sector skill-mix index. For a continuing firm, this 
implies that an increase in its share contributes positively to the between-firm component 
(and thus, aggregate skill mix) only if the firm has a higher skill mix than the initial average skill 
mix of the sector. This term may provide evidence on the importance of demand-driven 
factors in the evolution of aggregate labor skill mix. For example, if international trade and/or 
integration into the European community have increased the demand for skilled workers, then 
the observed change in skill mix should be primarily a “between-firm” phenomenon because 
employment should shift to more skill-intensive continuing firms. 
 
The third term represents a cross (i.e., covariance-type) term that tells us whether 
continuing firms that are increasing their employment share are also increasing their skill mix 
and viceversa. 
 
The last two terms represent the contribution of entering and exiting firms, 
respectively. This term could reflect changes either in demand, or skill-biased technological 
change, or both. For example, we have theoretical models [e.g., Campbell (1995); Caballero 
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and Hammour (1994); Lambson (1991)] that seem to back up the hypothesis of skill-biased 
technological change and are consistent with the within firm technology adoption discussed 
earlier. These models point at entry as the main way in which new technology is adopted and 
introduced into the economy.  In this type of models firms or plants with outdated technology 
will end up exiting. 
 
On the other hand, changes in product demands that require skill-intensive labor 
will induce the entry of firms that produce those skill-intensive products and therefore, this will 
contribute to the aggregate skill mix change. Later on, in the results section I will try to discern 
the different interpretations of the contribution of entry and exit. 
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3 Data 
3.1 General Characteristics of the ESEE 
The data come from the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE), a firm-level survey 
conducted by the Fundación SEPI. The ESEE is an annual survey sent to a panel of Spanish 
manufacturing firms, particularly large firms, and includes a representative sample of firm 
births and deaths for each year. Thus, in the context of this paper when I say “aggregate” 
change in skill mix, I will be referring to a change in the Spanish manufacturing sector. The 
survey is designed to change as industry composition evolves and was designed, in part, as a 
research tool. 
 
At the time this paper was written, the survey covers the period from 1990-1998 with 
an average of over 1500 firms in each year. The reference population for the ESEE is 
manufacturing businesses with 10 or more employees in Spain.  In the base year, firms were 
selected according to a selective sampling scheme. All firms with more than 200 employees 
(large firms) were asked to participate, and approximately 70% of the large firms respond 
in a given year. Firms employing 200 or less employees were chosen, according to a 
within-industry random sampling scheme. 
 
The ESEE is an unbalanced panel that attempts to capture the representativeness 
of the industry sector in Spain. Thus, aside from making every effort to maintain the 
continuing firms in the sample, the survey also strives to capture the entry and exit of 
manufacturing firms over the sample period. Newly created firms are selected and mailed 
surveys using the original selection criteria.  Firm exits are recorded each year and can be 
considered a sample representing the population of firms leaving the market over the period. 
 
The sample’s representativeness has been well documented by a number of 
authors. For example, Fariñas and Jaumandreu (1999) performed a series of cross checks 
with other data sources like the EPA (Encuesta de Población Activa or Active Population 
Survey) and the CB (Central de Balances from the Bank of Spain) to see if the evolution 
of key ESSE sample variables like employment, production and prices, is representative of 
the underlying population. They indeed find that the evolution/growth rates of these 
variables from 1990 through 1999 is consistent with  that derived from the other data 
sources. Also ESSE figures are reasonably consistent with other sources like the “Encuesta 
Industrial”4. In addition, the representativeness of the sample is, among other things, annually 
checked by the Fundación SEPI in its annual analysis and results publication. When 
comparing their figures to those offered by other sources of the aggregate population they 
find their “results always reasonable”5. 
3.2 Special Characteristics Used in this Paper 
For this analysis I choose to focus on data from the 1990, 1994, and 1998 surveys. One of 
the reasons I focus on these three years is that they contain some data essential to this paper 
that the other years’ files do not, namely information about firms’ technology innovations and 
workforce skill, which is critical for my analysis. Also, while 1990 and 1998 were years of 
                                                                          
4. See Un Panorama de la Industria Española published by the Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo of Spain 
in 1992. 
5. See, for instance, Resultados 2000 from Fundación Empresa Pública published by the Ministerios de Ciencia y 
Tecnología. 
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relatively high economic performance in Spain, 1994 represented the low point of a recession. 
Using these three years, then, allows me to look for business cycle effects in the results. 
3.3 Definition of Skill Mix 
Regarding the grouping of workers into high skilled and low skilled, the ESEE classifies 
workers into: i) “those with a Bachelor’s degree”, ii) “those with some college and/or high 
school diploma” and iii) “the rest of workers”. For the purposes of this paper, I consider skilled 
labor those individuals with at least a Bachelor’s degree and less-skilled labor the workers 
in the other two categories. The skill mix, Mt, is defined as in previous sections: the ratio 
between high-skill workers and all workers (including the high-skill group) in a given year. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Basic decomposition of skilled labor mix changes 
In this section, I present basic aggregate decompositions of the changes in skill mix focusing 
on the relative contributions of within firm changes, between firm changes, covariance term 
and net entry to the aggregate change in the skilled labor share. 
 
Table 1 below presents the results from the basic decomposition given in 
equation (3) the two four-year changes, 1990-1994 (recessionary period) and 1994-1998 
(recovery period) as well as for the 1990-1998 long difference change in skill mix. 
 
Table 1 
 
Simple Decompositions of Skill Mix Changes 
  Total Change Within  Between Covariance Net Entry 
Years in Skill Mix Share Share Share Share 
1990-1994 0.005 0.83 -0.04 0.31 -0.10 
1994-1998 0.012 0.93 0.00 -0.03 0.09 
1990-1998 0.016 0.67 -0.02 0.28 0.07 
 
Within Component 
The largest component is the within-plant component, which accounts for 67% of the 8-yr 
change, and 83% and 93% of the 4-yr periods respectively.  That is, 67% of the total change 
in skill mix in manufacturing from 1990 to 1998 is accounted for by continuing firms becoming 
more skill intensive.  In the four-year decompositions, the within effect accounts for almost the 
entire change. These results are qualitatively similar to those obtained by DHT. They also 
found that the within share was the largest single source of aggregate skill mix growth. 
 
These results are consistent with models of lumpy capital adjustment together with 
skill-biased technological change. For example, in their 1997 paper Cooper, Haltiwanger, and 
Power present a model in which existing firms adopt technology by retooling their plants and 
introducing new capital. The large within effect observed here would be consistent with this 
type of behavior if the newly introduced technology required skilled workers (that is if new 
technologies and skill are complements). 
 
Between Component 
The between component turns out to be the smallest of all the components for both the long 
and four-year differences; that is, the reallocation of workers from low to high skill-intensive 
firms (or viceversa) contributes little to the overall change in skill mix in Spanish manufacturing. 
It could be helpful to interpret this result in light of the extremely low worker mobility observed 
in Spain by several other authors. 
 
Effective reallocation requires that laid-off workers find new employment 
sources either through re-training, relocating, or both. However, Ahn, Rica and Ugidos (1998) 
conclude that a majority of unemployed Spanish workers are unwilling to relocate to find 
work.  For example, they show that less than 1% of working age males relocate to a different 
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region within a given year. This rigidity is largely unaffected by unemployment duration. 
A complementary finding comes from Bentolila and Chino (2000). They argue that stronger 
extended family networks in Mediterranean countries frequently provide additional 
unemployment insurance for their citizens. Either alone, or in combination, these factors may 
affect the rate and form of variations in aggregate skill mix changes. 
 
As I mentioned earlier, the between component would reflect increases in skill mix 
prompted by changes in the demand for more skill-intensive products; thus, the results 
appear to fail to support the hypothesis that skill upgrading is determined by demand driven 
forces. 
 
It is also worth noting that the between-firm effects are much smaller than those 
in the US according to the results obtained by DHT. They found that while the between 
effect was not dominant, it did contribute up to 25% of overall skill mix long-run change 
between 1977 and 1982. By contrast, the between effects among Spanish manufacturing 
firms are either insignificant or actually negative. A negative between term means that workers 
are actually moving from more skill-intensive firms to less skill-intensive firms. Or, more 
specifically, from firms with a skill mix above the manufacturing sector’s average to firms 
with a skill mix below the manufacturing sector’s average. 
 
Covariance Term  
A difference between these results and those obtained by DHT with US data is that here the 
share of the covariance term (or proportion of the total change in skill mix accounted for by 
the covariance term) is relatively large and generally positive (both in the short 1990-1994 
and long 1990-1998 differences). By contrast, DHT’s covariance share was much smaller and 
negative in two out of the four changes in skill mix. 
 
In Spain, however, Table 1 shows evidence that expanding firms increased their skill 
shares (and that shrinking firms’ skill-shares declined) in most cases. Most interestingly, 
the results obtained with Spanish data tell us that the four-year positive covariance term 
occurs during the recessionary period (1990-1994); that is, firms expanding their share of 
employment during the recession are also increasing their skill mix. Although the bigger 
change in aggregate skill mix does not occur during the recessionary period (as it does in 
the US), the firms that are expanding their employment during the recessionary period are 
also significantly increasing their employee’s skill mix at the same time. 
 
This finding seems consistent with creative destruction models that feature 
experimentation, the expansion of successful firms and the contraction of unsuccessful 
plants [Roberts and Weitzman (1981), Javonovic (1982), and Ericson and Pakes (1995)]. It is 
reasonable to expect that part of the experimentation process would involve the adoption 
of new technologies and, in the presence of skill-biased technological change, the hiring of 
additional skilled workers. 
 
To explore the covariance term in more detail, I divide the 1990-1998 continuing 
firms into four quadrants based on their changes in employment share and skill mix. Each 
quadrant’s contribution to the long-run aggregate skill mix changes is presented below in 
Table 2. I define the quadrants as follows: 
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Q1: Firms increasing employment share, upgrading of skill mix 
Q2: Firms increasing employment share, downgrading of skill mix 
Q3: Firms decreasing employment share, upgrading skill mix 
Q4: Firms decreasing employment share, downgrading skill mix. 
 
Table 2 
 
Decomposition of 1990-98 Change in Skill Mix by Long-Run Quadrant 
(Continuing Firms) 
Quadrant Contribution to Aggregate Skill Mix Change by Quadrant 
Q1 0.75 
Q2 -0.09 
Q3 0.51 
Q4 -0.17 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Employment and Skilled-Labor Share by Long-Run Quadrant (1990-98) 
(Continuing Firms) 
 Employment 
Share in Q 
Employment 
Share in Q 
Skilled-Labor 
Share in Q 
Skilled-Labor 
Share in Q 
Quadrant 1990 1998 1990 1998 
Q1 0.32 0.50 0.02 0.06 
Q2 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.03 
Q3 0.46 0.29 0.03 0.06 
Q4 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.04 
Total  1  1   
 
Note that firms that increase in employment share and also have skill upgrading 
(quadrant 1) account for most of the change in the aggregate long-run change in skill mix 
with 75% of that change. The second biggest contribution to the long-run aggregate 
change (51%) comes from firms that upgraded their skill mix, while simultaneously cutting 
their employment (quadrant 3) –which almost certainly explains why they contribute less to 
the aggregate change than quadrant 1 (employment increasing) firms (see Table 3 to see 
employment and skilled-labor shares)–. Taken together, the firms in quadrants 1 and 3 
account for more than 100% of the total change in skill mix between 1990 and 1998. 
However, their contribution is offset by the negative contribution of firms in quadrants 2 and 4. 
 
Net Entry 
While DHT found that net entry made a substantial contribution to aggregate skill mix change, 
my results indicate that in Spain the net entry term is positive although relatively small in the 
long difference. The two four year changes show that the positive long difference is the result 
of a strongly positive skill change between 1994-1998 that compensates the negative net 
entry term during Spain’s recessionary period. Since the net entry term accounts for both 
entering and exiting firms, it is not immediately clear if the negative sign during the 1990-1994 
period is caused by entrants having a lower than average skill mix or by exiting firms having 
higher than average skill mixes or both. Table 4 below helps sort out the two different effects 
by isolating the individual effects of the two net entry terms on aggregate skill mix change. In 
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general, Table 4 shows the share of the aggregate skill-mix change for which entering and 
exiting firms are accountable. 
 
Table 4 
 
Simple Breakdown of Net Entry’s Contribution to Skill Mix Changes 
  
Aggregate 
Change 
Net Entry Entering Firms Exiting Firms 
Years In Skill Mix Share Share Share 
1990-1994 0.005 -0.10 -0.20 -0.10 
1994-1998 0.012 0.09 0.06 -0.03 
1990-1998 0.016 0.07 0.05 -0.02 
 
When interpreting Table 4, it is important to keep in mind that in this decomposition, 
the exiting term is subtracted from the entry term. That is, exiting firms contribute positively 
to aggregate skill mix change when they are below the average skill mix (negative term). 
By contrast, entrants contribute positively to aggregate skill mix change when they 
are relatively more skill intensive than average (positive term). An interesting pattern 
emerges in Table 4: entrants are more skill intensive than average in the long difference 
because the effects of the low-skill entrants during the recession are compensated by the 
high-skill entrants during the recovery. By contrast, exiting firms in all time periods had 
lower than average skill mixes. Table 4 also shows that exiting firms are less skill intensive 
than entrants –except during the recession when entering firms had a lower skill mix than 
either continuing or exiting firms. 
 
This same information can be perhaps more clearly seen in Table 5a where I have 
directly measured the percentages of skilled laborers at each type of firm during each year. 
For example, entering firms in 1990-1994 had a particularly low share of skilled workers in 
their labor force, only compared to 3.1% for firms that exited during that period and 3.9% for 
continuing firms that same year (in t). In this time period, the firms that exit look more like 
continuing firms [in (t-1)] than do entrants. On the other hand, it is clear that the new firms in 
the 1994-1998 period were more skill intensive (4.2%) than both exiting firms and also 
previous periods entrants; in addition, they were only slightly less skill intensive than 
continuing firms (4.9%) during that same year (t). 
 
Table 5a 
 
Skilled Labor Shares 
 Exiting Entering Continuing Firms 
Period (t-1) (t) (t-1) (t) 
1990-1994 0.031 0.022 0.033 0.039 
1994-1998 0.034 0.042 0.037 0.049 
1990-1998 0.033 0.037 0.034 0.053 
 
The finding that entering firms have lower skilled-labor shares6 than continuing 
firms seems at odds with creative destruction models where new technologies can only 
be adopted by new firms. These models imply that the new firms would implant the 
                                                                          
6. Skilled-labor shares are defined as number of skilled labor at time t [or (t-1)] divided by employment at time t [or (t-1)] 
for each firm type. 
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latest technologies, and thus, should have the highest skill mixes of any type of firm; on 
the other hand, exiting firms would have outdated technologies, and therefore, the lowest 
skill mixes, but this is not what these results indicate. DHT also confronted this dilemma and 
they argued –supported by the long-standing empirical literature on the subject– that size has 
an important role in determining the technology intensity of an entrant vs. a continuing firm. 
They find evidence that controlling for size as well as industry and location, entrants have a 
higher skill mix than continuing firms. Unfortunately, data constraints bar me from replicating 
this exercise. 
 
Beside the share of skilled laborers at new firms, the other relevant factor in 
determining net entry’s importance is the firms’ shares of overall employment as displayed 
in Table 5b below. 
 
Table 5b 
 
Employment Shares 
 Exiting Entering Continuing Firms 
Period (t-1) (t) (t-1) (t) 
1990-1994 0.328 0.090 0.672 0.910 
1994-1998 0.136 0.126 0.864 0.874 
1990-1898 0.417 0.200 0.583 0.800 
 
Several points are worth noticing. First, the employment shares of exiting and 
entering firms vary quite a bit depending on whether the period under examination is 
a recession or a recovery. In the recessionary period the employment share of exiting 
firms (33%) is almost 4 times the one of the entering plants (9%). On the other hand, during 
the recovery, the employment share of both entering and exiting firms tends to be the 
same (around 13%). In the long difference, 1990-1998 period, the employment share of 
exiting firms (42%) is approximately double that of entering firms (20%). 
 
Second, also notice that even over the long difference, new firms account for 
only 20% of all firms while exiting firms account for almost half. This low total labor share, 
together with the similarity of exiting and continuing firms’ skill shares and the low skill shares 
of new firms during the recessionary period explain why net entry had such a low impact on 
aggregate skill mix in my sample. 
 
Finally, the role that net entry plays in supporting the competing hypotheses of 
skill-biased technological change and change in demand for technology-intensive 
products needs to be resolved. With this objective in mind, I run a decomposition at industry 
level (see industries in sample in Appendix). Results showing a strong positive between 
component would support the change in demand for technology-intensive products 
hypothesis. That is, technology intensive industries (with high skill mixes) would be gaining 
in employment share while low-technology industries (with low skill mixes) would be 
loosing employment share. On the other hand, if the results show a strong positive within 
component, they would support the skill-biased technological change hypothesis since this 
would mean that entrants (which would have higher skill mixes than exiting firms) continue 
entering the same types of industries. My results indicate that the within-industry component 
is positive and accounts for most of the net-entry change, thus, supporting the skill-biased 
technological change hypothesis. 
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Cyclical Pattern 
Finally, it is worth re-visiting the cyclical pattern of the skill mix changes. In the US data, 
DHT found that there were marked increases in the share of skilled workers during 
recessions that were only partially offset by mild declines during booms. As a result, 
almost the entire long-run increase in aggregate skill mix occurred during economic 
downturns in the US. In Spain, this does not seem to be the case; during the 1990-1994 
recession, the skilled-labor-share change was smaller that during the 1994-1998 recovery. 
Between 1990 and 1994, the aggregate skill mix change was 0.5% while during 1994-1998, 
was more than double the previous change at 1.2%. These results show that the percentage 
increase in aggregate skill mix is actually bigger during the recovery phase than during the 
recessionary period in Spain in the 1990s. 
 
 The proportion of skilled workers can increase either through increasing the 
number of more skilled workers or through the decrease of less-skilled labor. DHT spend 
considerable time trying to be sure that the observed counter-cyclicality in their data is not 
simply reflecting the firing of unskilled labor during recessions followed by their re-hiring 
in the recovery periods. With this in mind, Table 6 shows the percentage change in skilled 
and unskilled workers in both four-year periods. Interestingly, the growth in skill mix was 
accomplished somewhat differently during the two time periods. In the 1990-1994 period 
there was positive growth in the relative number of skilled workers and negative growth in 
the number of unskilled workers. In 1994-1998 by contrast the (larger) increase in skill mix 
occurred despite positive growth in the relative number of less-skilled workers. The increase 
in less-skilled labor share in that period was due to a much larger increase in the number of 
skilled workers than in less-skilled workers. 
 
Table 6 
 
Percentage Change in Skilled and Less-Skilled Labor 
  % Change in % Change in 
Years Skilled Labor Less-Skilled Labor 
1990-1994 7.1% -6.6% 
1994-1998 45.9% 9.4% 
 
To further explore the cyclicality of the aggregate change in skill mix from 1990 
to 1998, I perform an exercise similar to the one performed by DHT that attempts to 
connect the long change in skill mix, 1990-1998, with the cyclical pattern of the skilled-labor 
share changes. I use the 1990-1998 continuing firms as my sample and try to see how the 
employment and skilled-labor shares of these firms behave during the recessionary and 
recovery periods (i.e., the business cycle).  As in Table 2, I define the quadrants as follows: 
 
Q1: Firms increasing employment share, upgrading of skill mix 
Q2: Firms increasing employment share, downgrading of skill mix 
Q3: Firms decreasing employment share, upgrading skill mix 
Q4: Firms decreasing employment share, downgrading skill mix. 
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Table 7 
 
Quadrant Employment and Skilled-Labor Shares of  
1990-1998 Continuing Firms 
Period  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1990 Employment Share 0.317 0.062 0.460 0.161 
1994 Employment Share 0.422 0.081 0.373 0.124 
 Difference 1990-94 0.106 0.019 -0.088 -0.037 
      
1990 Skilled-Labor Share 0.023 0.062 0.029 0.056 
1994 Skilled-Labor Share 0.035 0.038 0.036 0.044 
 Difference 1990-94 0.011 -0.024 0.007 -0.012 
      
1994 Employment Share 0.422 0.081 0.373 0.124 
1998 Employment Share 0.500 0.100 0.291 0.110 
 Difference 1994-98 0.077 0.019 -0.082 -0.014 
      
1994 Skilled-Labor Share 0.035 0.038 0.036 0.044 
1998 Skilled-Labor Share 0.056 0.035 0.060 0.037 
 Difference 1994-98 0.021 -0.003 0.023 -0.007 
 
Several patterns of interest emerge from Table 7. For example, firms in Q1 
(expanding employment and upgrading skill mix) show increases in their skill shares in 
both the recessionary period and the recovery. However, the increase in skilled-labor 
is higher during the recovery period (1994-1998), a pro-cyclical pattern, which contrasts 
with DHT’s finding of counter-cyclicality in skilled-labor share changes in the US. 
 
Also, firms in Q2 and Q4 (those continuing firms with decreases in skilled-labor 
shares from 1990 to 1998), show decreases in skilled-labor shares in both the recession and 
recovery periods. However, during the recovery the decrease is a lot smaller than during the 
recession for both quadrants. Finally, firms in Q3 experience an increase in both periods, but 
this increase is much larger during the recovery period. 
4.2 Sub-Decompositions 
As mentioned earlier, Spain’s labor market has a number of unique features. In this section 
I explore the effects of these characteristics on aggregate skill mix change by drilling down 
and further decomposing the change by firm types that are particularly relevant to the 
characteristics of the Spanish labor market. For example, I separate firms with a relatively high 
percentage of permanent labor contracts from firms that rely more heavily on temporary 
contracts. These types of sub-decompositions could help inform discussions of Spanish labor 
market liberalization by identifying and quantifying the relative contribution of different types of 
employers to aggregate labor skill mix. 
 
Permanent vs. Temporary Labor Contracts Sub-decomposition 
As indicated earlier, a unique feature of the Spanish labor market is its rigidity. This rigidity 
arises from the pervasiveness of binding employment contracts carrying high separation 
costs. The effects of these contracts have been well documented in papers such as Bentolila 
and Saint-Paul (1992). In response to these contracts’ negative effect on employment trends, 
in 1984 the Spanish government created alternative types of temporary employment of 
workers with little or no separation costs (legal or pecuniary) upon contract termination. These 
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flexible contracts have allowed larger employment responses over the course of business 
cycles, particularly in the downward direction, but their effect on skill mix changes is unclear. 
As already mentioned in the Introduction, they also created a “dual” labor market where on 
one hand, there are workers hired on permanent contracts, who enjoy strong employment 
protection legislation and bargaining power through labor unions, and on the other hand, 
there are workers employed under temporary contracts who lack employment protection and 
bargaining power, and have much higher turnover rates and generally lower salaries. 
 
Therefore, an interesting question to ask in the context of this paper is: how are the 
skill-labor shares being accomplished? That is, what types of firms are accounting for most of 
the change in the aggregate skill mix, those hiring temporary or permanent-contract labor? 
Firms are classified as “High-permanent” worker firms if their average share (over the 
beginning and ending periods) of permanent-contract employees is 80 percent or more 
of their workforce. While any threshold is somewhat arbitrary, the 80 percent cutoff was 
selected because it is the median share of permanent workers for the firms in my sample. 
 
A clearly related issue is whether or not the changes in skilled and less-skilled 
workers come about due to changes in the shares of permanent or temporary workers. 
Finally, it would be interesting to know how are these dynamics affected by the business 
cycle. To begin to examine these issues, Table 8 presents a sub-decomposition of aggregate 
skill mix, which shows the proportion that each firm type accounts for by time period. 
 
Table 8 
 
Share of Aggregate Skill Mix Change By Firm Type and Time Period 
 
Firm Type 
Period High-Permanent Low-Permanent 
1990-1994    49%     51% 
1994-1998 67 33 
1990-1998 77 23 
 
Interestingly, Table 8 shows that during the recessionary period, the 
“low-permanent” firms account for slightly more of the aggregate skill-mix change, 
while the “high permanent” firms account for most of the increase during the recovery 
period. Although it is impossible to be certain of the cause of this pattern given these data, 
at first glance, one explanation for this could be that the “high-permanent” firms would 
be more reluctant to hire more (likely permanent-contract) workers during uncertain times. 
On the other hand, firms with a relatively higher percentage of temporary contracts, to 
the extent that they continue hiring predominantly temporary-contract workers, are 
more flexible and more able to adapt to changes in demand due to the business cycle. 
 
Continuing the exploration of how these changes in skill mix occur, I now examine 
whether the percentage changes in skilled and unskilled workers come about due to 
changes in the shares of permanent or temporary workers and how these dynamics are 
affected by the business cycle. Table 8a displays the percent changes in skilled and 
less-skilled workers by time period and firm type: “permanent” or “temporary” contract firms. 
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Table 8a 
 
Changes in Skilled Labor by Firm Type: 1990-1994 and 1994-1998 
 1990-1994  1994-1998 
  % Change in % Change in % Change in % Change in 
Firm Type 
Skilled 
Labor 
Less-Skilled 
Labor 
Skilled  
Labor 
Less-Skilled  
Labor 
High Permanent 1.5% -8.1% 36.0% 1.8% 
Low Permanent 21.8% -4.3% 75.1% 22.0% 
 
Several interesting patterns are evident in Table 8a. First, note that the hiring of 
skilled workers continues during the recession (1990-1994), but in firms with high shares 
of permanent-contract employees, skilled labor increases just 1.5%. By contrast, in firms with 
lower ratios of workers with permanent contracts, skilled workers increase by about 22%. 
 
Second, both types of firms not only continued to hire skilled workers during the 
recession (1990-1994), they both decreased their low skilled work force at the same time, 
particularly the firms with high proportions of permanent contract workers. This finding may 
not be what one would expect a priori, but it corresponds to the evidence collected 
by Toharia (1998) and Malo and Toharia (1994)7. It would be interesting to see if this finding 
would hold in other recessionary periods. 
 
During the recovery period (1994-1998), other patterns emerge. First, notice that 
this is the period during which low permanent-contract firms seem to make their largest 
employment changes –both of skilled and unskilled workers–. It is also interesting that the 
percentage increase in skilled workers is higher than that of the less-skilled, resulting in 
another increase in the skill mix (ratio), but it is achieved in a different way than it was during 
the recession. Second, compared to the recession period, the percentage changes, in levels 
and absolute value, in employment are much bigger than during the recession, particularly for 
skilled workers. 
 
Third, also note that the firms with a lower share of permanent contracts have 
greater sensitivity to the business cycle. That is, their workforce changes are greater than 
that of the “high-permanent” firms, particularly during the recession, when they had roughly 
twice the percentage change in less-skilled labor and almost seven times the change in 
less-skilled labor as did the “high-permanent” firms. This pattern supports the expectation 
that temporary labor contracts may be lending firms more flexibility as the  reforms intended.  
It may be that “low-permanent” firms are playing an important part in introducing flexibility 
into the labor market that previously would not have been possible. 
 
Finally, I should note that although they had lower percentage increases of 
skilled labor, “high-permanent” firms account for most of the change in skill mix because 
they account for a much larger share of employment than do the “low-permanent” firms. 
(See Table 8b below.) 
                                                                          
7. It seems that during the recessionary period, in particular 1993, firings of permanent-contract workers was 
exceptionally high due to structural adjustments in the manufacturing sector. 
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Table 8b 
 
Shares of Employment by Firm Type and Time Period 
  Period 
Firm Type  1990-1994 1994-1998 1990-1998 
Employment 
share 
0.59 0.63 0.62 
High-Permanent 
Employment 
share 
0.58 0.59 0.61 
Employment 
share 
0.41 0.37 0.38 
Low-Permanent 
Employment 
share 
0.42 0.41 0.39 
 
Technology Sub-Decomposition 
The evidence presented from the main decomposition (large within and small between effects 
and the role of net entry) seems to validate the skill-biased technological change hypothesis. 
If this is the case, then we should expect that firms with more technology or higher rates of 
technology adoption/innovations will also be the ones that have higher workforce skill 
upgrades. 
 
The next sub-decomposition will test precisely that and will look at whether the firms 
with more technology innovations also account for the highest proportion of the increase 
in the aggregate skill mix. I will refer to the firms with a higher number of process/product 
innovations as “high technology” firms; those with a lower number of technology innovations 
as “low technology” firms and those with no technology innovations as “no technology” 
firms8. 
  
Given these definitions, I conduct three aggregate skill-mix sub-decompositions by 
firm technology-type for the same three time periods. 
 
Table 9 
 
Proportion of Aggregate Skill Mix Changes by Firm Type and Time Period 
 Firm Type 
Period High Technology Low Technology No Technology 
1990-1994 1.03 0.05 - 0.08 
1994-1998 0.68 0.20   0.12 
1990-1998 0.79 0.22 - 0.01 
 
Table 9 shows what proportion of the aggregate change in skill mix is 
accounted for by “high technology”, “low technology” or “no technology” firms. The results 
appear consistent with the skill-biased technological change hypothesis. That is, firms 
with high rates of technology adoption account for more of the change in aggregate skill 
mix, particularly during the recessionary period where “high technology” firms accounted for 
over 100% of the change in aggregate skill mix. During the other 4-year change and the long 
                                                                          
8. My technology measure is calculated by dividing the number of process or product innovations adopted by a firm 
during (t-1) and t by the number of years that firm exists during that period. 
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difference, “high technology” firms accounted for more than half of the total change in skill 
mix. On the other hand, firms with low or no technology adoption accounted for considerably 
less of the change in skill mix than “high technology” firms. In particular, the “no-technology” 
firms accounted for a negative 8% and only 12% of the aggregate change in skill mix in 
the 1990-1994 and 1994-1998 periods respectively. In the long difference, 1990-1998, 
“no-technology” firms actually “contribute” by reducing the aggregate skill mix by 1%. 
 
However, we must also consider what share of overall employment these firms 
account for. That is, if high technology firms account for 60% of the increase in aggregate skill 
mix but 90% of employment, then they may actually be under-contributing to aggregate 
skill mix change. Table 10 below shows the employment share at each type of firm as well as 
each category’s change of skilled and unskilled workers. 
 
During the recession, “high-technology” firms clearly over-accounted for their share 
of aggregate skill mix change. They contributed most of the change in aggregate skill mix 
change, but only about ½ of aggregate employment. Meanwhile, “low” and “no technology” 
firms under-accounted for their shares of aggregate skill mix change. This is particularly clear 
in the case of the “no-technology” firms who, although they simultaneously reduced their 
skilled and unskilled workforce, cut their skilled labor force disproportionately more. On the 
other hand, the “high” and “low technology” firms show a similar percentage change increase 
in skilled workers. Each showed a clear pattern of increasing both types of employment, but 
also a disproportionately large increase in skilled workers. 
 
During the recovery period, a slightly different pattern emerges. While the “high 
technology” firms again accounted for most of the change in aggregate skill mix, their 
contribution is relatively small compared to their share of employment in either time period. 
“Low-technology” firms accounted for more of the aggregate skill mix than “no-technology” 
firms; and the first ones over-accounted for their share of skill mix change relative to 
employment. It is also interesting that all three types of firms increased their skill mixes by 
increasing their skilled employment more than their unskilled workforce. 
 
Finally, in the long difference we see that the “high technology” firms account 
for most of the change in aggregate skill mix, followed by “low technology” firms and lastly 
by “no technology” firms. “Low technology” firms disproportionately contributed to aggregate 
skill mix change, although “high technology” firms accounted for most of the overall 
change. “No-technology” firms had a decrease in the share of skilled labor; these firms lost 
more skilled than less-skilled workers. 
 
Perhaps most interestingly, the table also shows how the ranking of 
employment share has changed from 1990 to 1998. In 1990, the ranking in employment 
share was: “High-Technology”, (followed closely by) “No-Technology” and “Low-Technology” 
firms. In 1998, the ranking is: “High-Technology” firms, “Low-Technology” firms and 
lastly “No-Technology” firms. “High-Technology” firms experienced the largest increases in 
employment share in all periods while “Low-Technology” firms also had increases 
in employment share in all periods, but of a lower magnitude. By contrast, “No-Technology” 
firms did not increase their employment share in any of the periods. 
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Table 10 
 
Aggregate Skill Mix % Changes by Firm Type 
Proportion of Aggregate Change in Skill Mix by Firm Type  
 
Period 
Firm Type  1990-1994 1994-1998 1990-1998 
% change in 
skilled labor 
 
0.266 
 
0.664 
 
0.820 
% change in 
unskilled labor 
 
0.153 
 
0.276 
 
0.264 
Employment share 
in beginning year 
 
0.500 
 
0.496 
 
0.507 
High Technology 
Employment share 
In end year 
 
0.616 
 
0.579 
 
0.627 
% change in 
skilled labor 
 
0.267 
 
0.654 
 
1.184 
% change in 
unskilled labor 
 
0.117 
 
0.143 
 
0.364 
Employment share 
in beginning year 
 
0.103 
 
0.141 
 
0.172 
Low Technology 
Employment share 
in end year 
 
0.123 
 
0.148 
 
0.229 
% change in 
skilled labor 
 
-0.143 
 
0.330 
 
-0.349 
% change in 
unskilled labor 
 
-0.104 
 
0.103 
 
-0.262 
Employment share 
in beginning year 
 
0.273 
 
0.273 
 
0.202 
No Technology 
Employment share 
in end year 
 
0.260 
 
0.273 
 
0.143 
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5 Conclusions 
As in other developed countries, Spanish firms’ skill mix has increased during the 1990s.  This 
paper has attempted to examine whether this change in the Spanish labor market can 
be attributed to demand shifts towards more skill-intensive products or to skill biased 
technological change and has found, just as in the US, that skill biased technological change 
is a more likely explanation. Specifically, my decompositions showed that the largest 
component of the aggregate skill change is the within component. That is, the increase in 
aggregate skill mix mainly comes from continuing firms increasing their individual labor skill 
mixes presumably in response to the re-tooling or upgrades in technology in these firms. 
 
Furthermore, the increase or upgrade in skill mix seems to be procyclical in Spain. 
During the 1990-1994 recession the increase in skill mix is smaller than during the recovery 
period (1994-1998). This finding is different to the one found in the US, where increases in 
skill mix are found to be counter-cyclical. It will be interesting to explore this topic with data 
that covers more than one business cycle. This would help establish the pro-cyclicality or 
counter-cyclicality of aggregate skill-mix changes in Spain. 
 
Given the unique nature of Spain’s labor market, I performed a series of 
sub-decompositions to see how firms’ use of permanent or temporary contracts was related 
to skill mix change. The results from this sub-decomposition show that during the 
recessionary period, firms with a lower percentage of permanent contracts account slightly 
more for the increase in aggregate skill mix, but during the recovery period, the “high 
permanent-contract” firms account for most of the change. 
 
Drilling a bit more into this dimension, I found that “low permanent-contract” firms 
are the ones that experience the biggest percentage changes of skilled and less-skilled labor. 
However, due to the larger employment share of “high permanent-contract” firms, this type of 
firm accounts for most of the aggregate increase in skill mix during the recovery period. 
Nevertheless, the evidence presented indicates that “low-permanent-contract” firms may lend 
flexibility to changes in the labor market. 
 
Finally, I performed an additional sub-decomposition based on the technological 
“intensity” or rate of innovations of firms. The results again seem to support the skill-biased 
technological change hypothesis. They show that firms that innovate or adopt more 
technologies are also the ones that account for most of the increase in skill mix during 
the 1990s in Spain.  It is also worth pointing out that the ranking of employment share of 
High, Low and No-Technology firms has changed from 1990 to 1998. In 1990, the ranking 
in employment share was: High-Technology, (followed closely by) No-Technology and 
Low-Technology. In 1998, the ranking is: High-Technology firms, Low-Technology firms 
and No-Technology firms. High-Technology firms experienced the largest increases in 
employment share in all periods while Low-Technology firms also had increases 
in employment share in all periods, but of a lower magnitude. By contrast, No-Technology 
firms did not gain employment share in any of the periods. 
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APPENDIX 
Manufacturing Industries covered by the ESEE 
 
Code Industry 
1. Metals – Metales férreos y no férreos 
2. Non-metal Mineral Products – Productos minerales no metálicos 
3. Chemical Products – Productos químicos  
4. Metallic Products – Productos metálicos 
5. Agricultural and industrial machinery – Máquinas agrícolas e industriales 
6. Office machinery, computers, etc. – Máquinas oficina, proceso datos, etc. 
7. Electronics – Material y accesorios electrónicos  
8. Vehicles and engines – Vehículos automóviles y motores  
9. Other transportation equipment – Otro material de transporte  
10. Meat, processed food and canned goods – Carne, preparados y conservas 
11. Food products and tobacco – Productos alimenticios y tabaco 
12. Drinks – Bebidas 
13. Textiles and clothing – Textiles y vestido 
14. Leather and Shoes – Cuero, piel y calzado 
15. Wood and wood products – Madera y muebles de madera 
16. Paper, paper articles, printing – Papel, artículos de papel, impresión 
17. Plastic and rubber products – Productos de caucho y plástico 
18. Other manufactured products – Otros productos manufacturados  
 
 
To run decomposition at industry level, the following industries are grouped 
Codes 8 and 9 
Codes 10, 11 and 12 
Codes 13 and 14 
Codes 17 and 18 
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